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brazil’s rise on the international Scene:  
brazil and the World
A ascensão do Brasil no cenário internacional:  
o Brasil e o mundo
AMAdO LUIz CErvO*
From the cardoso to the lula era: brazil and the world
In the course of their sixteen years in office, Presidents Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1995-2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) were two 
statesmen who defined the pattern of Brazil’s integration into the international 
scene at the turn from the 20th into the 21st century. Cardoso’s ideas and decisions 
drew inspiration from the neoliberal political philosophy, while Lula’s derived 
from a logistic mission of the State. The two presidents’ modes of thinking are 
not sufficient to explain their strategies, though. As he essayed the logistic model 
of foreign policy in his second term, Cardoso, the neoliberal turned skeptical 
when he formulated the concept of asymmetrical globalization, paved the way 
for his successor, who adopted the new model to promote Brazil’s interdependent 
integration into the international scene.
From neoliberalism to global interdependence
Neoliberalism had both adverse and positive effects on Brazil’s international 
relations. Adverse effects included unilateral opening of the domestic consumers 
market, foreign trade deficit, foreign indebtedness, sale of assets of Brazilian 
companies, submission to consensuses and advice from capitalism’s center, 
obedience to the rules of global governance established by the rich to their own 
benefit, and the sacrificing of relations with emerging countries in favor of the 
first world; in sum, a country’s loss of power on the international scene.
In time, though, economic opening resulted in the modernization of 
industrial plants and made the Brazilian economy more competitive, while 
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liberalism led to a smaller role of the State and the attendant rise of society. Lula 
boarded this train already on the move and advanced farther on the path of real 
interdependence. He discarded previous mechanisms of dependent integration 
and placed Brazil among the nations that move on their own feet in search of 
their destiny, with their governments’ support. Here lies the jump in quality of 
the Brazilian model of integration into the international scene at the turn of the 
millennium: the State’s intermediary role and external action on behalf of the social 
segments, subsuming the national interest, which encompasses the objectives of 
producers and consumers, entrepreneurs and wage earners alike.
To stake out its space in the world, instead of just opening itself to the world 
as before, Brazil would have to face up the asymmetries caused by the inequality 
of power and benefits in the international order. To what extent has Lula’s Brazil 
succeeded in this respect?
The international order at the outset of the new millennium is in a state 
of effervescence involving actors and powers. Neoliberalism has receded to the 
periphery and placed itself at the service of the European Union and the United 
States, which reinforced their political, geopolitical, and economic alliance and 
resisted the regulation of economic activities, the root of the 2008/09 crisis. On 
the other hand, globalization had altered an order imposed by the liberal doctrine 
for the order dominated by the States and its military power, and by transnational 
corporations. Old capitalism’s supremacy and global logistic have had to come face 
to face with the emerging nations, which have come together to tame globalization’s 
impetus. To the north, one sees what Bertrand Badie calls the power’s impotence; 
to the south, we see the counterpower’s play; and according to Gilberto Dupas, 
both actors recognize the limits of the national States.
In the south, counterpower springs from the social and political legitimization 
on whose bases the rules of the new order are to be defined so as to benefit all; it 
springs further from democracy, which leads to the formulation of these rules. It 
springs also from neoliberalism, which motivates individuals and, on the other 
extreme, from terrorism, which nourishes the root causes. Globalization’s order is 
entering a new, still more global phase: each actor feels bound to the whole – to the 
rich and to the poor, to the developed and to the emerging countries, and to those 
benefited or excluded by capitalism – since all are affected by international trade, 
peace and war, the environment, human rights, the energy and the financial crises, 
and the scarcity of food. The entry of new actors on the stage adds other voices to 
the criticism of global asymmetries, and hampers diplomatic negotiations. This 
explains the stagnation of multilateralism, which was supposed to draw up the 
rules for the global order in the 21st century; it also explains the defensive reaction 
on the part of the developed countries, which reactivated the G-8, as well as the 
confrontation of two dispute settlement strategies: the Chinese-Brazilian, through 
the peaceful means of diplomatic negotiations, and the US-NATO, through the 























Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World
Since Cardoso and during Lula’s Administration, international order has 
undergone significant changes. These changes have allowed Brazilian foreign 
policy to mitigate the internal effects of the order established by others and, at the 
same time, to become an active participant in the formulation of the new order. 
How has this occurred?
With globalization of democracy seeming a utopian objective, as shown by 
the American failure in Iraq and by the continuity of the Chinese political regime, 
why not democratize globalization? This objective, susceptible of producing real, 
positive effects, is the mainspring of Brazilian foreign policy.
As a first step, Lula’s foreign diplomacy adopted this approach at the World 
Trade Organization’s Conference in Cancún, in 2003. Since World War II, 
international economic regulations had been established by capitalism’s center in 
its own favor. Developing countries, later called emerging countries, were at the 
most spectators at negotiation tables, and would certainly abide by the rules. All 
of this was seen as natural. After Cancún, in the view of Brazilian diplomacy, 
either the emerging countries would participate in the formulation of the rules 
or the process would stop. To create counterpower, this diplomacy worked then 
and thereafter to form coalitions in the South, the first of which was the G-20, 
a group of countries established on the occasion of the Cancún Conference to 
address trade issues.
The determination to democratize globalization added new facets to foreign 
policy: reinforcement of the role of the State as an international negotiator; 
sovereign defense of national interests, including big business under the process 
of being globalized; alliances with emerging countries with identical objectives, 
beginning with those of South America; open dialogue with, instead of 
subservience to more developed countries; and a component of morality in the 
form of fight against poverty and hunger.1
Lula has maintained the tradition of formulating and programming foreign 
policy as a State policy. It has preserved values, interests, and modes of conduct 
adopted through historical channels, such as an industrial calling and a harmonious 
connection between the State and society. It has preserved Brazil’s historical 
participation in multilateral negotiation organizations and increased by more 
than thirty percent the number of countries where Brazil maintains diplomatic 
representations. It has established three external objectives: a) market liberalism 
ensuring reciprocity of benefits; b) expansion of business abroad through trade 
and internationalization of Brazilian companies; and c) reinforcement of military 
power to influence global order and sectoral regimes. This is what makes the 
logistic strategy of incorporation into the international scene.
1 BADIE, Bertrand. L’Impuissance de la puissance: essai sur les nouvelles relations internationales. Paris: Fayard, 
2004. DUPAS, Gilberto. Atores e poderes na nova ordem mundial. São Paulo: Unesp, 2005. PAROLA, Alexandre 
G. L. A ordem injusta. Brasilia: FUNAG, 2007.
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Consolidation of the logistic mode of participation in the international scene
At the 2003 World Economic Forum in Davos, Lula, as an initial message of 
his first Administration, made clear his dissent from the neoliberal model, which 
he saw as an exaltation of the market-god. In the view of Foreign Minister Celso 
Amorim, blind faith in open markets and in the State’s stepping back cannot induce 
development and equality among nations. The new leaders have thus developed 
an awareness of the role of the State and demanded political action to allow the 
country to penetrate global processes as an active agent in the system, without 
submitting itself to the play of traditional forces.
A logistic State is one that does not lend itself merely to rendering services, as 
was the case at the time of developmentalism, or to remaining a passive spectator of 
market forces and hegemonic power, as was the case at the time of neoliberalism. 
It is a logistic State because it reassumes development’s strategic planning and 
the function of supporting and legitimizing the initiatives of other economic 
and social actors, to which it delegates responsibilities and power. Contrarily 
to literature’s presumption about globalization, this new mode introduced by 
Cardoso and consolidated by Lula prevents governments from being incapable 
of governing owing to international forces. Being Brazil an organized society, 
with its class associations bringing together industrialists, farmers, bankers, 
workers, businessmen, and consumers, it is incumbent on the State to support the 
achievement of the interests of these segments of society, watching over the welfare 
of all, which is the supreme national interest. As all of this depends on both internal 
and external factors, the State ensures that the national interest has a weight on 
foreign policy, and becomes an agent of global governance. This development 
warrants seeing foreign policy in the Lula era as a decisive step toward maturity.
Two factors, among others, contribute to the consolidation of the logistic 
State in Brazil: the high degree of society’s organization, which facilitates the 
leader’s coordinating work; and political and economic stability, which prompts 
the linking of internal governability’s logic to the logic of global governance. The 
combination of these factors, when placed at the service of development, gives 
rise to the logistic State, whose conduct differs from that of the neoliberal State, 
especially as it recovers the decision-making autonomy in the political sphere and 
turns to the reinforcement of national economy’s hard core in the economic sphere.
In light of this conceptual framework, we can now review the different 
areas of external activity geared to the achievement of the nation’s interests. And 
thereafter we can assess the results, as it is appropriate to a study of the country’s 
international relations.2
2 CERVO, Amado Luiz. Inserção internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008. 
CARDOSO, José Celso (org). Desafios ao desenvolvimento brasileiro. Brasília: Ipea, 2009. BRASIL, Ministério 
das Relações Exteriores. Política Externa Brasileira I. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, DEP: Diplomacia, Estratégia 
e Política. Brasília, MRE, n. 1, 2004. GUIMARÃES, Samuel Pinheiro. Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes. Rio 
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High priority attached to integration into the global scene
Brazil is forging ahead in the 21st century to become a globalist country. 
But its mode of integration into the international scene differs from that of other 
globalist countries, such as Chile’s. Chile’s international insertion fits the trade-
oriented globalism that prolongs society’s infancy by taking as guidelines free 
trade treaties and an economy based on primary exports, i.e., neoliberal precepts 
of the 1990s. Brazil adopts the industrialist globalism mode, characterized at this 
stage of maturity of the development process by two essential features: reciprocal 
multilateralism and economic internationalization. We advance now to a more 
thorough study of these features to describe the Brazilian mode of incorporation 
into the international scene in the 21st century.
The concept of reciprocal multilateralism
Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century operates through reciprocal 
multilateralism: “We want free trade, but free trade characterized by reciprocity,” 
said Lula in Davos on January 26, 2003. Reciprocity does not apply only to 
international trade. In all areas of the international order – economy, trade, security, 
environment, health, and human rights – reciprocity is ensured when the rules 
of multilateral order benefit all nations. Without these rules, international order 
remains at the mercy of the stronger, as shown since 1945 by the discussions at 
GATT-WTO and the UN, the two pillars of multilateralism.
As a co-founder of these two more relevant multilateral organizations devoted 
primarily to trade and to security, respectively, Brazil has maintained continuity 
of ideas and conduct, as it has advocated the peaceful, negotiated solution of 
disputes and the promotion of the interests of the rich and the poor through 
the international trade system. However, multilateralism has not been guided 
by these principles over time. In the 21st century, the Security Council still lacks 
representativeness, impartiality, and efficacy for maintaining peace, while the 
WTO lacks balance in the decision-making process to meet the nations’ interests.
As of 2003, Brazilian foreign policy has found more power to demand 
reciprocity in international relations. “We have formed the G-20 in Cancun, 
when the United States and the European Union were attempting to impose an 
unfair agreement that left farm subsidies virtually untouched and offered little 
or no opening to products of interest to developing countries, while demanding 
from these disproportionate concessions,” wrote Celso Amorim.
Brazilian diplomacy applies its concept of reciprocal multilateralism to trade 
and security, but also extends it to all areas of international relations. The concept 
involves two presuppositions: the existence of rules to govern the international 
order, without which the power disparity will prevail in favor of the great powers; 
and the joint formulation of these rules, so that they will not favor the interests 
of some to the detriment of the interests of others.
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Reciprocal multilateralism eliminates two theoretical utopias for an 
understanding of Brazilian foreign policy: hegemonic stability, and a necessary 
connection between foreign policy and political regime.
The hegemonic stability theory lies at the foundation of an international order 
based on the unilateral conduct of the dominating power – the United States since 
the end of the Cold War – or on the subservience of the others and the attendant 
irrelevance of the multilateral organizations. But a hegemonic instability theory 
would serve just as well as an explanation, according to Badie, as can be seen in 
contestation, anti-Americanism, terrorism, the outbreak of the financial crisis 
triggered at the hegemonic center, the random conduct of certain powers, the ease 
with which the States move. As hegemony does not engender order, much less an 
acceptable order, only multilateralism can preserve the order from the nations’ 
selfishness, in the view of Brazil’s foreign policy. In other words, the ideal order 
is the multilateral order.
A political regime does not necessarily show any connection with peace, 
development, justice, and mankind’s welfare. Liberal and democratic regimes 
operate toward these ends but may also operate in an opposite direction. In 
South America, development models have shown similar results, regardless of the 
democratic or authoritarian nature of the different regimes.3
Reciprocal multilateralism: examples
To describe the reciprocal multilateralism that characterizes the Brazilian 
foreign policy in the 21st century, we have chosen examples in five areas, for didactic 
purposes. (1) reciprocity in the international economy and in the decisions of the 
great economic powers: the G-8, whose meetings are attended by the Brazilian 
Head of State; and the financial G-20, whose first summit was held in November 
2008 to combat the effects of the crisis and the stagnation of the developed 
countries; (2) international trade and Brazil’s conduct at WTO’s Doha Round, 
as well as its determination to establish coalitions among emerging countries; (3) 
international security, especially the efforts before the Security Council, and the 
valorization of the strategy of negotiation instead of that of violence in dealing 
with issues; (4) climate changes and other environmental issues; (5) health and 
human rights.
1. international economy: G-8 and G-20
The basic characteristic of Brazil’s international economic relations is the 
pursuit of actual interdependence, i.e., of reciprocity in the achievement of interests 
through negotiation at different forums, and of economic internationalization. 
3 BRASIL, Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Política Externa Brasileira, I. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. AMORIM, 
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Since 2003, negotiations have incorporated this economic policy and guided 
diplomacy’s conduct at the WTO, in connection with the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), and toward the European Union, as well as in the formation of 
coalitions with emerging countries. The purpose of this strategy is to strengthen 
ties to the largest possible number of nations, blocs, and regions, regardless of 
their geographical situation, but with emphasis on the Southern Hemisphere, 
where Brazilian interests are more evident. In 2004, for instance, Argentina was 
the second largest destination of Brazilian exports, after the United States, while 
China came third, and southern countries were the destination of fifty percent of 
total exports. In 2010, China ranks as Brazil’s first trade partner.
In economic relations with the European Union and the United States, the 
unrestricted liberalization of business, financial, and products flows does not serve 
the achievement of the national interest, as the country still lags behind them in 
productivity. With unrestricted liberalization, Brazil would jeopardize its industrial 
future. It is under this light that one should understand the rejection of free trade 
treaties, which perpetuate asymmetries; the search for partnerships and coalitions 
in the South; the attention to Mercosur; and the construction of South American 
economic unity – all of which are features of foreign policy’s realism. While the 
North offers little other than a large market, and requires much in structural terms, 
relations with the South are more favorable, in addition to offering opportunities 
that would be insane on the part of good policy to miss.
The financial crisis that erupted in September 2007 in the United States 
and then spread to Europe, following the same pattern of capitalism’s 1929 crisis, 
reveals the new equilibrium of the international economy, thus showing the 
appropriateness of Brazil’s international economic policy, which maintains strong 
ties to the North, but reacts logistically to change. On the one hand, emerging 
countries appear, with good regulation, high productivity, production, and exports, 
in addition to holding huge amounts in United States Treasury papers; on the 
other, one sees bad regulation, high imports level, consumerism, low savings, and 
public indebtedness at the center of capitalism.
Rich countries hold frequent meetings to discuss the direction of international 
relations and their own interests, especially those that are not addressed by 
multilateral decisions of global organizations. For some years now, they have 
invited emerging countries they see as global actors to sit at the table. At the 
2007 Germany Summit, for instance, the G-8 (Germany, Italy, France, United 
Kingdom, United States, Japan, and Russia) invited one of the G-5 (China, India, 
South Africa, Mexico, and Brazil), and offered President Lula the opportunity 
to attend the negotiations of the rich. At its 35th Summit, held in Aquila, Italy, 
in July 2009, the G-8 decided to convert itself into the G-14 (G-8+G-5+Egypt). 
The invitation addressed at the G-5 was prompted not by mere courtesy but by 
these emergent countries’ weight, needed for addressing the issues and solving 
problems on a global scale.
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When the developed economies went into recession in 2008, the G-8 was 
forced to dilute itself into the financial G-20, which shelters the twenty largest 
economies plus the European Union, a forum then established for adopting 
measures against speculation and for reigniting growth. But it is the rich countries’ 
defense instinct that explains the maintenance of the G-8, which in June 2009 
had been declared dead by Celso Amorim and; Lula, accordingly, characterized 
the same forum as inadequate to make decisions about the international economy. 
At the June 2010 Toronto meeting of the two forums, the G-8 reformulated its 
modus operandi.
As the instinct of defense, coupled with emerging interests and the 
multiplicity of economic negotiation forums (G-8, G-15, G-20, and Central Banks) 
fails to conciliate decisions, it entails the irrelevance of these multilateral meetings 
for conceiving the new economic order, to be ultimately determined by the rich 
and the emerging countries. The rich countries’ economic stagnation reflects 
adversely on Brazilian economy in three ways: a reduction of exports, especially 
of manufactures, of foreign direct investment, and a slackening of the pace of 
economic growth. Reaction to these effects has been threefold: intensification 
of investments under the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC); reinforcement 
of the southern coalitions aimed at reforming the international financial system, 
the IMF, and the World Bank; and the making of ten billion dollars available to 
the IMF to reinforce its lending resources.
At economic forum meetings, Brazilian government has advocated biofuels 
as a means of meeting the energy challenge, which is similar to the challenge 
presented by China, with its massive population and its fast growth pace, to climate 
change. The investment protection issue, which puts in opposition the interests of 
two worlds, has been shifted to bilateral agreements. A new form of protectionism 
has come up into the discussion, introduced by countries such as Canada and the 
United States, which proclaim the freedom of investment but begin to reconsider 
and even prohibit businesses that might lead to the acquisition of their strategic 
corporations by emerging countries through shares transfer.
As regards intellectual property, which protects patents and technological 
innovation, discussion at the G-8 faces a similar situation. Regulations in favor 
of laboratories and corporations of rich countries are accepted with reservations 
by India and China, while Brazil has already issued compulsory licensing of 
medication against AIDS, thus breaking its patent.
From the negotiations with the big ones – if one might speak of real 
negotiation between rich and emerging countries – three conclusions can be drawn. 
First, the meetings address issues that are vital to Brazilian interests; the country 
should identify which regulations it would be advisable to accept and make its 
policy clear at multilateral forums and at the time of negotiating international 
agreements. Second, it is necessary to learn from this process, as the country now 
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perception imposes itself of how important it is for the national interest to preserve 
decision-making autonomy in foreign policy, as expressed in President Lula’s 
unpolished words at the conclusion of the Germany meeting: “The developed 
world thinks that it can make a speech and that we have to take it as the last 
word and obey.”4
2. international trade and the WTo
Globalization stimulates international trade in goods, services, and factors. 
The volume of foreign trade, exports and imports reflects on the income of 
producers and consumers, on the employment level, and on the country’s external 
finances. Hence, attention should be devoted to trade.
After the trade deficit of the 1990s owing to the devaluation of the Real in 
1999, Brazilian foreign trade showed an upward trend, but it was only as of 2003 
that this rising trend confirmed itself, with considerable surpluses, owing to higher 
consumption and higher prices of export commodities. Finance Ministry data 
show that exports totaled 48 billion dollars in 1998, 60 billion in 2002, and 197.9 
billion in 2008, falling to 152.3 billion in 2009, due to the crisis. Surpluses also 
arose, from minus one billion dollars in 1999 to 40 billion in 2007. This was the 
year when the list of exports was further diversified, including agribusiness exports, 
in which Brazil is a world leader (it ranks first as an exporter of ethanol, sugar, 
coffee, and orange juice), and sophisticated exports, such as aircraft and software. 
Manufactures, which accounted for 52.3 percent of the total, exceeded primary 
exports then. In 2007, the United States and the European Union accounted 
for less than half of Brazilian exports – 65 billion dollars as compared with 161 
billion dollars. As consumption in rich countries fell, China became Brazil’s first 
trade partner in 2010.
Despite globalization, the modernization of the Brazilian productive system, 
and the logistic strategy for integration into the international scene, Brazil has not 
been able in the 21st century to substantially modify its list of exports and to reap 
greater benefits from foreign trade. In 2009 it exported more commodities than 
manufactures. As regards manufactures, 40 percent went to the major economies 
(United States, European Union, and China), while another 40 percent went to 
Latin America, which attests to the attention to the neighbor countries.
These data illustrate the Brazilian diplomacy’s activism at the WTO. As an 
advocate of the liberalization of markets, Brazilian diplomacy seeks to address 
the imbalance between Brazilian productivity’s higher status within the global 
system and its low participation in international trade. Two specific objectives drive 
Brazilian participation at these negotiations: to secure the liberalization of the 
4 BATISTA JR. Paulo Nogueira. O Brasil e a economia internacional: recuperação e defesa da autonomia nacional. 
Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2005.
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agricultural market and the end of farm subsidies in Europe and the United States; 
and refusal to make any concessions on manufacture trade as long as this injustice 
is not redressed. That is, to establish the reciprocity of trade benefits between the 
rich and the emerging countries. This Brazilian trade policy practiced also at the 
WTO governs all negotiations; and as it met with resistance, it caused the collapse 
of the FTAA and of the Mercosur-European Union Free Trade Agreement.
The trade G-20 was formed in Geneva, in August 2003, during preparatory 
meetings and thus preceded the Cancun Conference. It is made up of emerging 
countries willing to prevent the acceptance of results predetermined by the 
Northern powers at multilateral trade negotiations. Its original membership has 
been expanded from twenty to twenty-three member countries, whose ministerial 
meetings take place at regular intervals. The WTO has been taken by surprise by 
the upsurge of the emerging countries, which has caused it to change its modes of 
negotiation. It no longer accepts prior agreements between rich countries proposed 
to the Assembly as a possible consensus to be imposed from above. The interests 
of the South now make part of the negotiations’ dynamics.
The two group’s confrontation, particularly on the agricultural issue, dragged 
on for the entire decade, hampering negotiations, and confirming Celso Amorim’s 
prediction that the WTO would tend to become irrelevant. On one side, stood the 
rich countries, which did not yield to the emerging countries’ right to take part in 
the decision-making power which determines global trade order, demanding from 
them the liberalization of their industrial markets without giving up their farm 
policies; on the other side, stood the emerging countries, which since Cancún had 
gained sufficient power to do away with subservience in international relations 
and to ensure reciprocity in the achievement of interests. In June 2006, the Doha 
Round negotiations were suspended and were actually resumed only at the end of 
the decade. But discouragement took hold of diplomats and specialists. Agricultural 
negotiations were thus shifted to the United Nations, which convened a major 
FAO Assembly in 2008, in Rome, to discuss food security, which was placed in 
jeopardy by the food crisis. The meeting was attended by forty heads of state and 
4,800 delegates from 192 UN member countries.
As it happened at the WTO, negotiations at FAO also bogged down and 
yielded insignificant results. In brief, at trade negotiations, countries easily shift 
responsibilities to one another.
For Brazil, multilateralism’s failure at trade negotiations in the 21st century 
both harms and disturbs political decisions in matters of foreign trade: should 
one continue to wager on global free trade, move toward the bilateralism of free 
trade as advised by diplomats of the Cardoso era and some businessmen, or seek 
an alternative in the South? As long as a change of strategy did not occur, the 
South alternative began to materialize. Trade with China now ranks first, South 
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December 2009 Brazil signed a trade agreement with 22 developing countries, 
under which mutual tariffs have been reduced by 20 percent.5
3. Security and the Security council
The powers’ security policy shows an internal face, the provision of means, 
and a strong connection with foreign policy. Despite multilateralism and the 
formation of blocs, security is grounded on internal reality, from where it draws 
the means for action and for exercising the decision-making power. In recent 
years, the Brazilian academia has involved some groups in the study of security 
issues, which are no longer limited to a concern on the part of the armed forces 
and of diplomacy. According to Vaz, there is a gap in Brazil between the strategic 
capability and the perception of the role to be played at the regional and global 
levels.
With its ability to form consensuses, Brazilian diplomacy offsets the armed 
forces’ scarce means of dissuasion and defense. This is why it extols Brazil’s 
international role in security matters. It berates the United States’s unilateral 
preemptive action, the doctrine of European intervention and terrorism; in 
addition, it to links security to development and to the combat of hunger. It 
proposes a strategy of favoring negotiation over the resort to violence for the 
solution of conflicts and the maintenance of peace. It points out the positive 
effects of its praxis on the construction of peace and calls for the democratization 
of decisions at the Security Council as another way of achieving reciprocity in 
the multilateral order. It has recently taken initiatives in this respect, such as the 
attempted mediation between Iran and the West in regard to that country’s nuclear 
program; also in the talks between Arabs and Israelis regarding conflicts in the 
Middle East. But Brazilian diplomacy has not been successful in its attempt to join 
the exclusive club of political and military power, which remains firmly closed.
The 1996 plan to reform national defense led to institutional advances, such 
as the establishment of the Ministry of Defense and the alternation of civilian 
ministers at its whelm, which however produced no effect on the country’s strategic 
capability. Ten years later, the Lula government drafted a second plan conceptually 
appropriate for reequipping the armed forces but whose results are not yet known: 
to restart the military industry and technological research aimed at providing 
the armed forces with internal means. But as long as a cultural change does not 
occur in the country, foreign policy will remain deprived of operational means.
Despite these contradictions, Brazilian foreign policy moves on with 
the intention of playing a relevant role in the field of security, based on the 
negotiated conflict solution. In 2004, Brazil joined Southern Cone countries, 
5 BRASIL Ministério das Relações Exteriores. O G-20 e a OMC: textos, comunicados e documentos. Brasília: 
FUNAG, 2007. Idem, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 83, 2003. See “Informe sobre o Comércio 
Mundial 2008 – O comércio em um mundo em processo de globalização,” prepared by the WTO.
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Argentina and Chile, secured the cooperation of Uruguay, Peru, and Bolivia, 
assumed the command of the troops, and acted to bring peace, development, and 
redemocratization to Haiti – Brazil’s major involvement in UN peace missions 
since 1946.
Let us now look at two objectives of Brazilian external involvement: the UN 
Security Council and the South American Defense Council.
Consistently with its pacifist foreign policy, Brazil has preference for a 
multilateral approach as a mechanism for solving conflicts. It attaches importance 
to the UN Security Council, of which it has made part since its founding, and 
frequently participates in peace missions. But Brazil calls for a reform of the 
Council in view of its lack of representativeness and of effectiveness in facing 21st 
century conflicts.
In 2005, the Brazilian government submitted to the UN General Assembly a 
proposal for the Council’s reform, a proposal that had the support of other members 
of the G-4 (Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan), a group of major powers that 
wish to be made permanent members of the Council. Despite the G-4 endeavors, 
global reaction prevented the reform. The five permanent members’ fear of losing 
power, the regional rivalries among powers, and disagreement as to the nature 
of the reform have kept the Council just as it was when it was established right 
after World War II.
On the occasion of the signing of the treaty establishing the Union of 
South American Nations (Unasur) in Brasilia in 2008, the Brazilian government 
submitted a proposal for the establishment of a South American Defense Council 
as one of Unasur steering bodies. After some obstacles to its establishment were 
overcome, the Defense Council was officially established in March 2009. Its 
purpose is to keep external powers away from security matters in South America, 
to maintain the region as a zone of peace and negotiation, and to solve any regional 
conflicts.
Threats to security in Brazil’s neighborhood do not come from the 
reequipment of the nations’ armed forces, ideological differences between 
governments, of geopolitical rivalries. But the United States’s reactivation of the 
IV Fleet, which operates in Latin America, Central America, and the Caribbean, 
inactive since 1950, and the use of seven airbases ceded by Colombia are a regional 
hegemonic power’s answer to South America’s pretended security autonomy.6 
6 VAZ, Alcides Costa. La agenda de seguridad de Brasil: de la afirmación soberana hacia la cooperación. In: 
Cepik, Marco e Socorro, Ramírez (orgs.). Agenda de Seguridad Andino-Brasileña. Bogotá: Fescol, 2004, p. 145-
174. PAGLIARI, Graciela De Conti. O Brasil e a segurança na América do Sul. Curitiba: Juruá, 2009. BRASIL, 
Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Política Externa Brasileira, II. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, Resenha de 
Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 96, 2005. ALSINA Jr. João Paulo Soares. Política externa e política de defesa no 
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4. climate and other environmental issues
In the view of the Brazilian foreign policy, the environmental issue 
encompasses three other issues: the planet’s survival; development; and hunger. 
Multilateral negotiations for establishing appropriate regimes to address these issues 
have always been carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. Three 
Conferences were devoted to the matter: Stockholm in 1972; Rio de Janeiro in 
1992; and Johannesburg in 2002. Brazilian diplomacy has played a significant 
role in this area, with the intention of introducing the reciprocity of effects into 
the discussion.
The industrial countries introduced the environmental issue into 
multilateralism at the Stockholm Conference; thereafter, the developing countries 
injected their interests into the discussion, and in this Brazil has had a prominent 
role, as it has always associated the issue with development, and more recently 
with sustainable development.
The discussion has turned into polemics. On one side, the rich countries 
ascribe poverty and hunger to causes located in the South, such as corruption, 
government incompetence, and the restricted opening to the economic agents 
of capitalism’s center. Since Rio-1992 they have been willing to finance projects 
of their interest. On the other side are developing countries, who point to the 
industrial countries as the culprits of environmental degradation and of the 
inequality among nations. Though hampered, the discussion has proceeded, 
with conceptual gains for the developing countries, but with scant actual effects 
in general.
Climate change has become the most salient issue in the discussion. It 
surfaced in 1992, was the subject of a convention that entered into force in 1994, 
made headway after the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, in force since 2005, and has attracted 
public attention owing to the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, released by the United Nations since 1990.
International law sets targets for pollutant gas emissions that cause the 
planet’s warming; these targets are compulsory for the industrial countries and 
left to the emerging countries’ sense of responsibility. Alleging that compulsoriness 
interferes with its sovereignty, the United States has refused to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, thus setting up a serious obstacle to the regime’s success ten years after 
it was established. Moreover, the Copenhagen Conference failed.
Under these circumstances, the United Nations is going ahead with its 
efforts to save the planet from the climatic scourges that compromise not only 
the planet’s very survival but also the survival of the poor. In late 2007, the XIII 
United Nations Climate Change Conference was held in Bali, Indonesia, and was 
attended by 189 countries. Totally isolated, the United States gave in and finally 
a protocol of intentions for the post-Kyoto era was signed, to enter into force 
in 2012. The regime was supposed to make progress as the emerging countries 
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committed themselves to reduce their emissions with the help of technologies 
financed by the rich countries, including the United States, which would then 
make quantified cuts.7 But the truth is there has been no progress. This is the 
conclusion warranted by the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, the 15th 
conference of parties on climate change, which was attended by heads of state and 
fifteen thousand delegates.
5. Health and human rights
Military spending and the costs financial systems’ recovery after the recent 
crisis have required huge sums, particularly in the developed countries. The 
internal and international impact has been indifference toward hunger, the 
internal difficulties of many nations, and the heightening of international tension. 
Mankind’s food situation became more serious in 2007-08.
The Brazilian foreign policy regarding human rights, as in the aforementioned 
cases, is critical of an international order devoid of reciprocity or justice. Human 
rights have been seen traditionally by the North in light of the ideas inherent to 
the liberal revolutions of the 18th century, which were incorporated into the United 
Nations 1948 declaration. Since World War II, this strain of political philosophy 
has inspired the realism of international relations theory and of political praxis, 
which vests the States with hegemony for defining the global order on the basis 
of interests and power, or rather, on the basis of the interests of those that wield 
power, without taking morals into consideration. This realism, a target of criticism 
in the North as well, does not match the Brazilian vision, which for decades has 
associated human rights with development and, in the Lula era, with combating 
poverty and hunger.
At the UN General Assemblies he has attended since 2003 and at meetings 
of world leaders and of multilateral organizations, President Lula or his diplomats 
have chastised an order that ignores the scourge of hunger and disease, thereby 
violating human rights. On the domestic front, action is taken through social 
programs such as the Family Grant, the driving engine of the Zero Hunger 
subprogram; on the external front, action is taken through cooperation extended 
to poorer countries, especially from Africa. Before Lula, the Brazilian government 
already resorted to international negotiations in this area, and achieved results, such 
as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights-TRIPS mechanism 
adopted by the WTO, under pressure from the emerging countries, so as to rein 
in the right to medical drugs patents and expand the use of these medicines when 
required by public health. As an example, it may be mentioned that in 2007, the 
Lula government, frustrated over the lack of results in the negotiations with a 
7 LAGO, André Aranha Corrêa do. Estocolmo, Rio, Joanesburgo: o Brasil e as três conferências ambientais das 
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lab holding the rights to the Efavirenz, a drug for combating AIDS, ordered the 
competent agency to break its patent.8
Internationalization of the Brazilian economy
For the first time in history, internationalization of Brazilian companies has 
become part of the country’s external strategy. Lula indicated this conceptual 
change at the 2005 Davos World Economic Forum when he said: “Something 
I have repeatedly said to Brazilian businessmen is that they should not be afraid 
to make their companies into multinationals, to make investments in other 
countries, as this would be very good for Brazil.” At meetings with businessmen, 
Celso Amorim, has reaffirmed the objective of turning Brazil into a globalized 
country, through the expansion of its businesses abroad. “Brazil has exchanged a 
participation in the international scene through dependence and subordination 
for a sovereign, cooperative participation…,” said the President that same year 
before hundreds of businessmen in São Paulo. The dialogue between Lula and 
the business community will continue.
A trend that has deserved much attention in international relations since 
1990, globalization manifests itself in two ways: access to markets and expansion 
of internal businesses abroad and of external businesses into the internal domain. 
Europe and the United States have benefited from globalization and thereby 
increased their systemic competitiveness since the end of the Cold War. Brazil’s 
objective in this regard is to have strong corporations to compete on a global scale, 
with the State’s logistic support and the financial support of national institutions, 
such as the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and the 
Bank of Brazil. If Cardoso privatized [enterprises], Lula conglomerated [them]. 
The President’s finger is behind the formation of the great national conglomerates. 
Despite this earlier achievement, Brazil has a long way to go before attaining 
the density of developed countries, whose multinationals co-opt their own 
governments, which then form coalitions and use pressure to influence decisions 
at multilateral organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, 
and for the signing of bilateral treaties, and ultimately to obtain internal and 
intergovernmental rules in their own favor.
The Brazilian businesses’ rising globalization trend has been recorded by 
the Brazilian Society of Studies on Transnational Corporations and Economic 
Globalization, whose data we have used here.
The internationalization of the Brazilian economy has picked up speed 
since 2005, in tandem with the trend in the emerging countries. Brazilian direct 
investments abroad have increased an average of 14 percent a year, rising from 




6.4 billion dollars in 2004 to 18 billion dollars in 2006, but falling to 13.9 billion 
dollars in 2008 and dropping to 4.5 billion dollars in 2009 owing to the global 
financial crisis. The emerging countries held about 5 percent of direct investments 
abroad in 1990 but this percentage exceeded 20 percent by 2007. In that year, 
with 180 billion dollars consolidated, Brazil had become the second foreign 
investor among the emerging countries and foreign investments in Brazil totaled 
34.6 billion dollars, a 100-percent increase over the previous year. In early 2008, 
international reserves totaled 194 billion dollars, a threefold increase over the 
previous two years (59.8 billion dollars), and continued to rise, exceeding 250 
billion dollars in 2010, after the country received the investment grade from the 
risk rating agencies. In December 2008, Brazil’s consolidated direct investment 
abroad totaled 149 billion dollars.
Brazilian corporations invest abroad, starting in South America, where they 
maintain about one thousand companies, showing that the movement involves 
medium companies as well as large groups. Among the major ones, Vale do Rio 
Doce and Petrobras lead the way, followed by Gerdau, Embraer, Odebrecht, Itaú, 
Braskem, Votorantim, Camargo Correia, and WED, and others. They operate in 
various areas, including mining, prospecting, metallurgy, industry, and technology. 
Because of the legislation in neighbor countries, investments have been redirected: 
between 2001 and 2008, investments in Argentina fell from 15 percent to 9 percent; 
between 2001 and 2010, the share of investments in the United States, which 
became the main investments destination, rose from 13 percent to 37 percent of 
Brazil’s total direct investments abroad.
The companies’ motivation varies: a valued currency, which prompts 
the acquisition of shares in multinationals; the establishing of subsidiaries; 
the association with or the purchase of other companies, which facilitates the 
raising of financial resources abroad; technological development; and raising 
productivity to a systemic global level, in addition to stimulus to higher quality 
exports. Globalization occurs also when a company enters production chains in a 
worldwide network. By failing to follow this trend, national economy perpetuates 
its structural dependence. As a remarkable example of this gain in maturity, one 
often refers to Embraer, whose performance has been studied by Martinez.
After its 1994 privatization, anchored on the technological knowledge 
amassed by two previous centers – the Brazilian Aeronautics Center and the 
Aeronautics Technological Institute – the Brazilian Aeronautic Corporation-
EMBRAER turned to global market, adopted new innovation processes, 
replenished its resources, and embraced specialization for competing. Years later, it 
ranks as third maker of commuter jets in the world, and its products have topped 
the list of Brazilian exports.
The central countries are showing signs of concern over the pace and the 
effects of the internationalization of businesses from emerging countries and are 
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is being accumulated in the treasury of emerging countries that are exporters of 
raw materials or manufactures, such as the Arab countries and China. These 
countries establish sovereign funds, which currently total about three trillion 
dollars, of which 250 billion in possession of the Brazilian treasury.
The reversal of the financial situation now under way still does not displace 
the hegemony of the capital of developed countries, but is leading these countries 
to resort to other forms of protectionism, such as raising difficulties to or barring 
transfer of the control of the assets of their multinationals to emerging countries, 
arguing that control of their multinationals determine their structural position 
on the capitalist system’s hierarchy.
Before seeking developed markets, Brazilian capital was channeled primarily 
to South America, especially to Argentina, where today it is part of Quilmes, in 
the brewery area; of Perez Companc, in the fuel and energy sector; of Loma Negra, 
the cement concern; of Alpargatas, in textile and footwear; and of Acindar, the 
steel company; in addition to major export packinghouses.9 
integration and bilateralism: establishment of the global network
The formation of blocs is the trend in international relations in the 21st 
century, although it lacks the dynamics of the 1990s. The European Union has 
given up on a Constitution, rejected through plebiscites in 2005, and replaced it 
with the Lisbon Treaty, which has also failed to obtain unanimous approval of 
the 27 members. In South America, governments endeavor to improve social and 
economic conditions, which had deteriorated at the time of neoliberalism, and 
seek domestic solutions, based on national projects, in addition to programming 
different modes of participation in the international scene. Here also, some 
governments do not view integration as an efficient strategy for overcoming 
difficulties. Under these circumstances, the Brazilian foreign policy, of a marked 
integrationist bent, makes use of integration processes to establish or consolidate 
the cooperation and power network directed at the South, starting from South 
America and advancing toward alliances with other regions, so as to achieve the 
goal of making Brazil into a global-oriented country.
Mercosur and Unasur
The concept of relations along the same axis has been introduced into the 
international relations theory on the basis of a study by Patrício, who investigated 
the role played in the origin and development of integration processes by bilateral 
relations between key countries in a region, such as France and Germany in the 
9 BRASIL, Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Política Externa Brasileira, II. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, 
Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 96 e 97, 2005. SARFATI, Gilberto. Carta Internacional, USP, out. 2007. 
MARTINEZ, Maria Regina Estevez. A globalização da indústria.
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case of the European Union, and Brazil and Argentina in the case of MERCOSUR 
and South America. We have presented this concept and reviewed its application 
to the South American case in my book Inserção Internacional.
Brazil-Argentina relations were affected by the 1999 devaluation of the Real, 
the Brazilian currency, and even more seriously by Argentina’s profound economic 
and social crisis in 2001-2002. At the outset of the 21st century, the governments 
of Néstor Kirchner and of Luiz Inácio da Silva faced a trade dispute caused by 
Brazilian export manufactures that hindered Argentine industrialization. Other 
factors helped raise further difficulties in the management of bilateral relations 
and their impact on neighbor countries: scarce provision of energy, the acquisition 
of Argentine debt bonds by the Venezuelan government, and the approval of 
Venezuela’s adhesion to MERCOSUR by Uruguay and Argentina and obstruction 
on the part of the Brazilian and the Paraguayan Congresses for some years. As 
regards multilateral negotiations, the two countries have been in tune because 
they have identical interests. The same has occurred in regard to regional security 
on the occasion of the crisis between Colombia and Ecuador in March 2008, 
triggered by a preemptive action by Colombia against a guerrilla camp located 
on Ecuadoran territory. In brief, the axis has survived, the partners walking side 
by side though not hand in hand.
In addition to the exponential growth of Brazilian direct investments in 
Argentina, bilateral trade has also been favorable to Brazil. Between 1996 and 
2003, Argentina recorded yearly surpluses of nearly one billion dollars, equivalent 
to a little over 10 percent of total bilateral trade. Between 2004 and 2007, as a 
reflection of the Argentine crisis, it was Brazil’s turn to record surpluses that rose 
from 1.8 billion to 4.0 billion dollars. Significantly, manufactures account for 
nearly all Brazilian exports, less than 30 percent of Argentina’s. This difference 
in the exports list is an indication of unequal development.
Succeeding her husband as President of the Republic in 2008, Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner expressed willingness to reestablish good understanding 
with Brazil, as Argentina had shown to be capable of economic recovery. Attention 
was then given to deepening integration in the areas of energy, science and 
technology, defense, production, space, and nuclear matters. This past February, 
the two countries signed seventeen bilateral agreements covering these areas, an 
indication that both see relations along an axis as being essential.
The first South American countries summit meeting, held in Brasilia in 
2000, reflected the intent of furthering regional integration, with Mercosur as 
a starting point. An action plan for the integration of regional infrastructure 
(IIRSA) was then established. The 2004 summit meeting of the 12 countries 
in Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais, took steps in this direction, establishing funds 
to finance economic convergence and the organization of a future community 
of South American nations. The Mercosur Parliament, with its headquarters in 
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fact, Mercosur decisions mingled with South American decisions, showing the 
desired intertwining of the two integration processes.
Brazilian foreign policy sees Mercosur as a political project that neoliberalism’s 
crisis and the continued existence of asymmetries have made more flexible. 
Organized segments of Brazilian society intended to use it in favor of their business 
transactions, while diplomacy envisages it as an instrument for reinforcing the 
international bargaining power. All things considered, integration purports to 
establish a regional hub more appropriate for achieving the objectives of multilateral 
reciprocity and of globalization of the Brazilian economy. At bottom, just as in all 
countries and sectors of international relations, the hegemony of national interests 
comes first, more so in the 21st century than in the 1990s.
The building up of South America advanced, consistently with Brazilian 
political thinking, with the announcement of the Community of South American 
Nations at the 2004 Cuzco Summit, which was established on the Margarita Island 
in 2007, but became institutionally enacted under the Union of South American 
Nations-Unasur constitutive treaty signed on May 24, 2008 at the summit of the 
twelve South American countries in Brasilia.
On the basis of its operational structure and purposes, one could say that 
Unasur does not play only a mediating role between Brazilian interests and foreign 
policy’s global objectives. If it becomes operational, the recently created nucleus 
of power– the entity South America – will fully meet Brazilian interests.
The Union is structured into four bodies: The Council of Heads of State, 
the Council of Foreign Ministers, the South American Defense Council, and the 
Council of Delegates.
Unasur came into being to serve political, geopolitical, and economic 
objectives. In the political area, when the Member States unanimously approve 
decisions, their intention is to put the region on the world map, express the 
unison voice of the countries in a multilateral setting, and enhance its political 
independence, as it enjoys the status of a legal entity under international law. In the 
geopolitical area, although it is not a military alliance, it creates a regional nucleus 
of power and ascribes emphasis to regional security; disputes in this context are 
settled through diplomatic activity, on the basis of South American international 
law doctrines, respect of sovereignty, and nonintervention in the internal affairs of 
the States. This precludes the intervention of external powers and organizations, 
such as the OAS, the Rio Group, and the old Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance signed at the outset of the Cold War. In the economic area, Unasur 
seeks to promote production, energy, and infrastructure integration, but without 
replacing either Mercosur or the Andean Community, both of which remain active.
This South American integration process displays two distinctive 
characteristics: originality as compared with other experiences and the fact that 
it starts with political and geopolitical rather than economic integration, as was 
the case of the European Union.
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Doubts raised at the time of Unasur’s founding regarding its performance 
questioned the possibility of excessive bureaucracy, the superimposition of regional 
bodies, the scarceness of financial resources, and the difficulty – given the cult of 
sovereignty and political arrogance – of implementing projects aimed at improving 
infrastructure and at energy integration. One finds in South America a variety 
of models of international integration, and different worldviews and concepts of 
regional integration. Nevertheless, favorable conditions warrant this new step 
forward in the process of integration: economic growth early in the century and 
greater social inclusion, in addition to the establishment of financial reserves and 
the availability of energy stocks.10
Casting the net beyond the neighborhood
The casting of a global network as a goal of Brazilian foreign policy in the 
21st century gains impetus with reciprocity multilateralism impelled by diplomacy, 
which establishes coalitions and takes the leadership in global negotiations, and 
with economic internationalization, impelled by Lula’s personal interest and by 
economic and social agents. The net weaves its first threads in South America in 
these two aspects and, fortified at its base, extends toward the world, as if this 
were Brazil’s natural locus. We should now look at this long-reach movement and 
the ties to blocs, regions, and countries beyond South America.
1. blocs and regions
Relations between Europe and Brazil take place in three contexts: relations 
between the European Union and Mercosur; relations between the European 
Union and Brazil; and relations between European countries and Brazil. Since 1995 
negotiations have been under way for establishing a European Union-Mercosur 
free trade area; but though fifteen years have elapsed, no conclusion has been 
reached. The impasse is due to the Brazilian aversion to treaties that do not include 
reciprocity, as is the case here and with the treaty calling for the establishment of 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which has never been concluded 
either. Europeans and Americans do not relinquish their agricultural subsidies and 
protectionism but demand concessions in the areas of industrial goods, public call 
to bids, and services, which would place Brazil’s industrial development at risk.
However, recognizing Brazil’s role in the international economy and in 
multilateral negotiations, especially in the conclusion of WTO’s Doha Round and 
of the Mercosur-EU agreement, the European Union, at a special summit meeting 
10 PATRÍCIO, Raquel C. de C., As relações em eixo franco-alemãs e as relações em eixo argentino-brasileiras: 
génese dos processos de integração. Lisboa, ISCSP, 2007. CERVO, Amado Luiz. Relações internacionais da 
América Latina: velhos e novos paradigmas. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2007. COUTO, Leandro Freitas. O horizonte 
regional do Brasil: integração e construção da América do Sul. Curitiba: Juruá, 2009. SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes. 
As estratégias de cooperação Sul-Sul nos marcos da política externa brasileira de 1993 a 2007. Revista Brasileira 
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held in 2007, proposed to confer on Brazil the status of a “strategic partner”, a 
proposal that was endorsed by the European Parliament. In the European view, 
Brazil, as a key country in the region, is an indispensable ally in meeting global 
challenges related to climate change, human rights, intellectual property, industrial 
policy, and other economic and social issues. The European decision was based on 
specific data and on expectations: Brazil accounts for approximately 80 percent 
of Mercosur’s GDP; while the European Union accounts for 22 percent of the 
Brazilian foreign trade, it directs only 1.8 percent of its foreign trade to Brazil. 
European investments in Brazil are significant, but business would increase should 
there be a better regulatory framework and lower customs duties – if adopted, 
these measures would facilitate European Union’s relations with South America. 
This concession to Brazil signals a change in the European bloc’s international 
strategy; since its formation, the bloc had assigned priority to inter-bloc relations, 
assuming that it would export its model of integration that yielded recognized 
benefits. Brazil became European Union’s eighth strategic partner, after the United 
States, Japan, Canada, India, Russia, China, and South Africa. The programming 
of the joint cooperation plan began promptly and has continued at ministerial 
meetings and at a series of Brazil-European Union summits held since then.
The financial crisis affected the European Union, disclosing some countries’ 
heavy public indebtedness, triggering recession, and threatening the Euro. Trade 
with and investments in Brazil were indirectly affected. A further difficulty in 
recent bilateral relations has been raised by Brazilian diplomacy’s strong reaction 
to the EU’s collective measures and police action to contain and discipline 
immigration. This reaction was especially strong in view of the detention and 
mistreatment of about 2,500 Brazilian tourists at the Madrid airport in 2008 and 
the mistaken execution of Brazilian Jean Charles at the London subway. All these, 
as Itamaraty officially pointed out, meant disregard for human rights.
Bringing together potentially great economies, Brazil took the initiative of 
forming a political bloc of emerging countries, which was formally established 
in 2007, under the acronym BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The bloc 
purports not only to promote business transactions among its members by also 
to coordinate their diplomatic activity and adopt common stances in respect of 
issues of their interest in international negotiations. Its weight on the international 
scene has rapidly increased owing to the accelerated growth of the four economies 
and to the recession that has affected the rich countries. As was the Brazilian 
diplomacy’s desire, from now on multipolarity is a fact, so that the establishment 
of rules for the global order has now to mean shared responsibility.
Since the first BRIC foreign ministers meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russia, 
in May 2008, there have been other meetings of foreign ministers as well as of 
other authorities. In 2009 summit meetings of the four great emerging countries 
have been held on a regular basis, the first of which also in Yekaterinburg and the 
second in Brasilia in 2010. The bloc is gaining life and now has influence on the 
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establishment of the rules that govern the global order by the financial G-20, the 
IMF and World Bank policies, the United Nations reform, the Doha Round and 
the legal frameworks in important areas of international relations. World power is 
thus acquiring a new face, with BRIC being on the same footing as the old G-8.
IBAS is another political group devoted to cooperation among its members 
and to the harmonization of positions vis-à-vis the international scene. It came 
into being in Brasilia in 2003, bringing together three major southern countries 
inclined to make autonomous decisions – each one being the major democracy on 
its respective continent: India, Brazil, and South Africa. Other than global interests 
that occupy the group in their successive summit meetings, such as associating 
social inclusion and development, South-South cooperation is envisaged under 
agreements covering areas of specific needs, such as trade, security, information 
technology, energy, health, food, and interconnection with Mercosur.
The emerging countries have given indication of their strength at the joint 
BRIC-IBAS summit meeting held in Brasilia in April 2010, when international 
economy was facing the worst crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s 
and at a time when global governance is at a crossroads, facing the challenge of 
promoting sustainable development.
In May 2008, Lula attended the summit meeting of the member countries of 
the Central American Integration System (SICA) held in El Salvador, to reinforce 
economic, political, and cultural relations with one more regional bloc, one that 
unites eight countries of Central America. The command of the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), successfully carried out with 
concern for economic and social issues, has opened the doors of the Caribbean to 
Brazil. Not only Haiti but also other countries in the region are receiving attention 
from the Brazilian government, which provides logistic support for business 
transactions and investments, especially for oil prospecting and the production 
of biofuels. The new interest in the region, previously removed from Brazil and 
close to the United States, was illustrated by the Brazilian diplomacy’s disastrous 
involvement when the Honduran Judiciary and Executive deposed President 
Manuel Zelaya in 2009, accused of threatening to subvert the Constitution.
The net extends also to Africa and the Arab countries. Lula has visited 
Africa more than a dozen times, in addition to helping bringing about the African 
Countries-Latin America summit meeting and being a special guest at the African 
Union Summit. Positive results from this approximation include programs in 
the area of health, especially for combating AIDS, credit lines, the presence of 
Brazilian contractors, activity by Petrobras, integration with Mercosur, increased 
exports, and a common stance against farm subsidies. Although economic and 
strategic returns from relations with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking 
Countries (CPLP) are scant, cultural gains are substantial. Africa is creating 
favorable conditions for foreign presence, and in this respect the United States, 
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Since 2003, the government intended to change the Brazilian policy toward 
the Near East and the Arab countries and even to establish an Arab-Latin American 
bloc so that the two regions could raise their voices at international negotiations 
and Brazil could expand its trade with the Muslim world. This thought led to 
the South America-Arab Countries Summit held in Brasilia in May 2005, a 
new example of Brazilian diplomacy’s activism. The summit was attended by 33 
countries – 11 from Latin America and 22 from the Arab world, including the six 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – and 800 businessmen. The summit 
elicited no concern on the part of the powers used to intervening in the region – 
Europe and the United States – given the Brazilian diplomacy’s moderating role 
worldwide. The same cannot be said of the agreement signed by Brazil. Turkey, 
and Iran aimed at making possible the Iranian nuclear program. On the occasion, 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton voiced the indignation of the United States’s 
conservative sector against the Brazilian diplomacy’s naïve intervention in an area 
where western powers have been traditionally involved.
2. bilateralism
Bilateral relations or relations between a given country and a bloc 
have intensified in the 21st century for three main reasons: first, the crisis of 
multilateralism, as illustrated by the United Nations inefficiency and its stagnated 
reform, and the WTO’S incapacity to conclude the Doha Round; secondly, the 
State’s reinforcement after neoliberalism’s failure, especially in Latin America, and 
the United States’s unilateralism; thirdly, the proliferation of bilateral free trade 
agreements – the new trade policy carried out outside the WTO.
Bilateral free trade agreements have stricken a fatal blow against negotiations 
of a global agreement at the WTO. Brazilian diplomacy abhors the former as much 
as it prefers the latter. By 2007, a network of approximately 400 of these bilateral 
agreements had been signed, encouraged by the United States, eventually joined 
by the European Union, particularly in Asia and in Latin America.
Relations between Brazil and the United States unfold in a dual context: 
on the one hand, the foundation provided by a historical political and economic 
alliance between the two countries, whose benefits have always been perceived 
and appreciated by both parties, regardless of which governments are in office; 
on the other hand, competition between the two, both as regards geopolitical 
views and the confrontation of specific economic interests. This substratum 
conditioned bilateral relations under the two Administrations of George W. 
Bush and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the first decade of the 21st century. The 
two leaders talked with each other with frankness and autonomy, whether in 
agreement or disagreement.
Used, just as their predecessors, to consulting with businessmen of their 
respective countries, Bush, Lula, and Barak Obama have had little to do to help 
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them move forward on their own and discover business opportunities on the 
other side, as the way has been opened decades ago. But the presidents of the 
two countries have established on their own a special partnership under the 
technological cooperation agreement signed in Camp David in March 2007, on 
the production and marketing of ethanol and other biofuels. In addition, the two 
governments have signed a military cooperation agreement in April 2010, without 
compromising sovereignty. And through negotiations, they have solved bilateral 
disputes, such as the one caused by WTO’s authorization for Brazil to retaliate 
against the United States because of cotton subsidies.
Relations between Brazil and China, viewed as strategic by both governments 
view as strategic, are based on the principles of mutual trust, bilateral trade, 
and coordination of positions in respect of multilateral policies, pursuant the 
communiqués issued by Hu Jintao and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the two 
presidents, as they exchanged visits in 2004 and 2010. Relations are closely followed 
by the Brazil-China Businessmen Council. Studies sponsored by this Council 
have shown that Brazil has progressed from being an exporter of commodities to 
being a destination of Chinese investments and that since 2009 China ranks first 
as Brazil’s trading partner. During Jintao’s last visit, a wide-ranging Joint Action 
Plan was established.
The strong effort to establish a partnership springs from the familiarity 
cultivated at multilateral forums, such as the conferences on the environment, the 
financial G-20, and BRIC, and finds bilateral expression in trade and investments. 
Imports of capital goods, raw materials, and intermediary goods have facilitated 
the expansion of the Brazilian industry, while the imports of final consumer 
goods have fallen to approximately 10 percent. The trend of business transactions 
attenuates the pressure of Brazilian industrialists on the government to contain 
the entry of Chinese manufactures, such as footwear, plastics, and textiles, as well 
as Itamaraty’s complaint because of the lack of Chinese investments in Brazil. On 
the other hand, Brazilian investments in China are scarce and restricted to the area 
of technological cooperation between Brazil’s National Space Research and the 
Chinese Space Agency, which in 2007 launched jointly a remote sensing satellite.
Brazil and India take common positions at multilateral forums, especially 
aimed at changing trade rules to their benefit, but their bilateral cooperation is 
meager and IBAS does not fill this gap. Despite good political and geopolitical 
understanding, as illustrated by BRIC’s very existence, another country that 
maintains bilateral relations with Brazil much below the potential is Russia, as 
regards both trade and technological cooperation. There persists in Brazilian 
diplomacy a utopian presumption of a possible transfer of military technology 
by other countries, such as Russia, France, China, and the United States. This 
presumption became evident in the attempts made by Defense Minister Nelson 

























Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World
To celebrate the first centennial of Japanese immigration, Japan’s Crown 
Prince visited Brazil in 2008. On that occasion, an assessment was made of our 
historical bilateral relations, comparable to those established with the United 
States, if one considers the participation of Japanese companies in Brazil’s 
industrialization process in recent decades. Brazilian agribusiness exports to Japan 
also enhance these relations, recently intensified by cooperation in the area of 
biofuels production and marketing. The challenges to be met for strengthening 
these relations further call for the expansion of bilateral trade, still modest, and 
for higher Japanese investments, which have remained stagnant in recent years 
and kept Brazil as a seventh destination.
As regards Europe, in addition to maintaining traditional relations, the 
Lula government has renewed the nuclear agreement with Germany and now 
welcomes France’s renewed interest in our country. Portugal and Spain are the 
21st century newcomers, as our bilateral relations shifted from the sentimental 
to the instrumental plane. As dynamic agents of economic internationalization, 
the two Iberian countries have turned their attention to Brazil, which they have 
chosen as their preferential partner in Latin America for both economic and 
cultural reasons. Around 2000, Brazil became the first destination of Portuguese 
and Spanish direct investments abroad, which have been channeled in Brazil to 
both large and medium enterprises. As privatizations have ceased, just as has the 
establishment of great corporations, particularly in the area of communications, 
these flows will tend to abate.
In South America, despite the formation of blocs, relations privilege the 
bilateral trend, such as in energy integration projects, for instance. On the occasion 
of Argentina’s bicentennial celebration, two books edited by Botana and Russel 
have compiled excellent analyses of the internal and external profile of that country, 
Brazil’s main partner. They also explain in depth the concepts of declinación and 
of international extravío, as well as Brazil’s success and difficulty in dealing with 
Argentina. Countries with a strong introspective bias, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Paraguay do not disturb Lula’s good humor, and he maintains 
spontaneity in his relations with their leaders.
From the preceding and on the basis of other cases not mentioned, one 
concludes that in the world of globalization all attention should be devoted to 
bilateralism, the crucial path for ensuring the achievement of national interests. 
This is a tempting stance, as multilateralism and integration are two waning trends, 
while the unfettered movement of national States seems to be the rising tendency.11
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Since Cardoso and during Lula’s Administration, the international order has undergone 
significant changes. These changes have allowed the Brazilian foreign policy to mitigate 
internal effects of an order established by others and, at the same time, to become an 
active participant in the formulation of the new order. To democratize globalization became 
the mainspring of Brazilian foreign policy. In the scope, President Lula has maintained 
the tradition of formulating and programming foreign policy as a State policy, and also 
has fostered the logistic strategy of incorporation of Brazil into the international scene.
resumo
Do governo Cardoso ao governo Lula, a ordem internacional passou por significativas 
mudanças. Essas mudanças permitiram a política externa brasileira mitigar os efeitos 
interno da ordem estabelecida pelos outros ao mesmo tempo em que participa ativamente 
na formulação de uma nova ordem. Democratizar a globalização tornou-se motivação da 
política externa brasileira. Nesse escopo, o Presidente Lula manteve a tradição de formular 
e programar a política externa brasileira como política de Estado, mas também aprofundou 
a estratégia logística de inserção do Brasil no cenário internacional. 
Key-words: Brazilian foreign policy; new global order; emerging countries.
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